Match Group reported second-quarter revenue of $853 million, down about 1% from a year ago. Net income rose 36% to $171 million. Adjusted EBITDA rose 14% to $331 million. Earnings came in at 92 cents per share, missing consensus by roughly 5%, and the stock fell.
So the company earned substantially more money on slightly less revenue, and the market disliked it. That combination is the whole story of this stock.
The quarter
| Metric | Q2 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $853M | −1% year over year |
| Net income | $171M | +36% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | $331M | +14% |
| EPS | $0.92 | missed by ~5% |
| Tinder revenue | $457M | — |
| Tinder daily active users | — | −4%, best in 10 quarters |
Q3 revenue is guided to $885–895 million.
What management is actually fixing
Spencer Rascoff, who took over as chief executive in 2025, owns the Tinder problem directly. The plan he laid out is not a growth plan — it is a repair plan, and it addresses a specific diagnosis: young users find swiping repetitive and high-pressure.
The roadmap follows from that. Discovery redesigned to be more expressive and less repetitive. Verification and safety strengthened. Roughly $60 million budgeted for AI and product rollouts at Tinder. Tinder Events scaling to 26 cities by the end of September — an attempt to move the product off the phone and into rooms where people meet.
That last one matters more than it sounds. A dating app's structural problem is that it succeeds by losing its customer. Events change the unit of value from a match to an evening out, which is repeatable.
The number that decides the thesis
Tinder's daily active users fell 4% year over year. Ten quarters ago that decline was running at 10% and worse; monthly active declines have narrowed from about 12% to 6–7%.
A shrinking decline is not growth. It is the derivative moving in the right direction while the level is still falling. Rascoff says year-over-year growth could arrive "any day now." Until it prints, the honest description of Tinder is: still losing users, more slowly.
What you are paying
At $37.26 the stock carries a market capitalisation of $8.55 billion, a trailing P/E of 13.2 and a forward P/E of 12.4, against trailing revenue of $3.51 billion. It pays $0.80 a year, a yield near 2.2%. Trailing net income is $707.8 million, up 31.6%. Nineteen analysts average a $41.81 target.
Thirteen times earnings for a company growing profits 30%+ looks like an obvious mispricing until you notice what is not growing. Revenue is flat. The profit growth comes from cost discipline and margin expansion, and those are finite. You cannot cut your way to a higher revenue line forever.
How I read it
This is a cash-generative business trading at a multiple that assumes decline, run by management that is executing visibly on cost and tentatively on product. Two ways it resolves:
If Tinder's user base turns positive, the story changes from "cheap melting ice cube" to "cheap company that stopped melting," and a 13x multiple on a stabilised business is genuinely low.
If the decline stalls at −4% and stays there, the profit growth exhausts itself in a few quarters, and 13x turns out to be the right price for a business slowly shrinking.
The dividend and buyback mean you are paid modestly to wait for the answer. That is the actual proposition here: not a growth story, an option on stabilisation with a coupon attached. I want to see one quarter of positive Tinder DAU before I call it a turnaround rather than a deceleration.
The risk that gets underrated: dating is a category where the product problem and the demographic problem are the same problem. If Gen Z has structurally moved away from swipe-based discovery, no amount of AI on top of a swipe deck fixes it — and the fix would then have to be a different product entirely.